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Abstract—Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) has been a 
technological approach that has received considerable research 
attention over the past decade.  At the same time, the relative 
paucity of deployed systems using some of these technologies 
speaks to either a mismatch between research priorities and 
practical needs, regulatory immaturity, technology immaturity, 
or a combination of these.  In this paper, we examine the business 
decision that a spectrum entrant must take with regard to 
technology choice.  We use a simple decision-analytic framework 
using standard Net Present Value (NPV) calculations to analyze 
that decision.  Our conclusion is that, using the rough cost 
estimates and a simple system model, that exclusive use offers a 
higher NPV than the alternatives.  The second choice is 
cooperative sharing, followed by opportunistic sharing under 
optimistic spectrum availability and contention assumptions.   
If our assumptions are relatively close to reality, it is 
therefore not surprising that we do not see greater adoption of 
DSA technologies – it is not the top choice for spectrum entrants 
with a long term view.  The second choice, cooperative sharing, 
does occur, but in the form of MVNO agreements.  The last 
option for a spectrum entrant is opportunistic sharing.  Why 
should an entrant settle for the third best approach?  
Keywords-Dynamic Spectrum Access, Cognitive Radio, 
Decision Analysis, Cost Analysis 




 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic 
Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN) in 2011, an undertone 
of the meeting was that academic research was irrelevant in 
practice.  This did not show up in the papers in the published 
conference proceedings, but was clear in the questions and in 
the hallway conversations.  Summarizing the main elements of 
the argument:  
 after about a decade of research in DSA technologies, 
there has been little to show for the effort in the way of 
practical systems; and 
 academic research has not been paying attention to 
priorities for commercial implementation. 
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#1149422 .   
While these criticisms surely have some merit, there have been 
some notable contributions to this end (see, for example, [1-5]).  
In this paper, we do not seek to debate these observations, but 
rather to gain insight into the barriers to adoption of DSA 
techniques and technologies. 
In its simplest form, spectrum sharing involves providing 
spectrum access opportunities to market or industry entrants 
whose application is best met by wireless systems.  Spectrum 
access opportunities occur because license holders (i.e., 
spectrum incumbents) do not utilize their spectrum 100% of the 
time.  Sharing can occur through cooperatively (i.e., through 
explicit bargaining) or opportunistically (i.e., without 
bargaining).   
To address the criticisms described above means, in part, 
exploring the conditions under which DSA might be adopted.  
To do this, we must examine the incentives and constraints of 
both primary and secondary users.  The incentives that primary 
users have for sharing have been studied (see [5] and others), 
though these studies often do not consider the business 
strategies, investment and technological risks that primary 
users face.  Similarly, the decision processes of potential 
secondary users must be studied to understand the 
circumstances under which they adopt this technology.  The 
choices confronted by potential secondary users in context has 
received little attention beyond the work of Tonmukayakul and 
Weiss [1] and Weiss [2].   
We refer to potential secondary users in context because 
entrants have a range of choices they can make.  In the simplest 
form (used by [1]) the entrant can choose to obtain a license, to 
use license-free spectrum or to use a secondary use technology.  
Within the domain of secondary use, they have a range of 
choices available (outlined very briefly above but described in 
more detail by [4].  Each of these choices carries risks, such as 
investment risks, technological risks, service risks, strategic 
risks as well as benefits, such as return on investment, QoS 
premiums, etc.   
In this paper, we will build a first order model of the 
secondary user’s decision across these choices, accounting in a 
simple way for these risks.  Since the range of choices is large 
and highly context dependent we will focus only on spectrum 
entrants who intend to operate a direct infrastructure-based 
system in one of four ways (outlined below).  In doing so, we 
do not include MVNO relationships, or the kinds of spectrum 
 access that might occur under virtualized mobile networks [6]. 
We use Net Present Value (NPV) to demonstrate the 
investment and return for each spectrum choice, and 
summarize the preferred situations.  
The paper is organized as follows: section II elaborates an 
entrant’s spectrum choices and their consequences. Section III 
computes the NPV for based on a set of cost assumptions. 
Section IV examines the risks and potential management 
flexibility for each spectrum choice. Section V summarizes the 
paper and proposes future research. 
II. SPECTRUM CHOICES 
In our simplified choice regime, we model an 
infrastructure-based spectrum entrant who is confronted with 
four alternatives (summarized in Figure 1) — exclusive use, 
cooperative sharing, opportunistic sharing, and unlicensed 
usage. The spectrum entrant must make an irrevocable choice 
of one of these four approaches to provide a wireless service.  
We assume that the revenue that the entrant can obtain is not 
dependent on the approach that is chosen, but, for simplicity, is 
linearly dependent on the service quality s/he can achieve, the 
number of users reached, and the period of time that these can 
be reached.  For simplicity, we assume the revenue is certain in 
all scenarios. 
Figure 1.  Decision tree for tangible cash flow 
Before we delve into the details of the analysis, it is useful 
to consider these alternatives qualitatively (from [2]).   
 Exclusive use requires that the entrant obtain a 
spectrum license via primary or secondary markets [7].  
This gives the entrant optimal opportunity to engineer 
their systems to a desired quality level without 
involvement of other parties.  The spectrum entrant 
becomes a license holder and primary user. 
 Cooperative sharing means that spectrum entrants 
must first negotiate a spectrum use agreement with a 
license holder.  We differentiate this from an MVNO 
in that we assume here that the entrant provides their 
own infrastructure.  The spectrum entrant becomes a 
secondary user and can provide service subject to the 
priorities of the primary user.  The service quality risk 
is somewhat higher because of that subordination; 
because it is a matter of contract, the quality depends 
more on the ability to enter into an agreement than it 
does on the execution of the agreement (assuming 
perfect remediation for contract breach).  We assume 
also that the contract provides exclusivity for the 
secondary user. 
 Opportunistic sharing means that spectrum entrants 
must have the capability to sense primary users’ 
activities so they can take advantage of idle spectrum 
slots. There are numerous types of spectrum holes and 
context acquisition approaches (see [2, 3] for a 
discussion and analysis).  The service quality risk 
under this approach is higher than under cooperative 
sharing for two reasons: (1) the spectrum entrant relies 
on the probability that spectrum holes are available at a 
sufficient frequency and bandwidth [3, 8] and, (2) the 
spectrum holes may need to be shared with other 
opportunistic users, so the throughput of those holes is 
uncertain.  For the purposes of this paper, we are 
implicitly assuming stochastic, exogenous spectrum 
holes, though this analysis could apply easily to other 
kinds of exogenous spectrum holes as well. 
 Unlicensed means that all spectrum users have equal 
access to the bands (primary non-cooperative sharing 
according to [9]).  Thus, the quality that any user can 
achieve depends on (1) the probability of other active 
unlicensed users at that time and (2) the characteristics 
of the MAC protocol in use.  However, there is no cost 
for spectrum licenses, contracts or sensing required in 
this approach, so it may well be the cheapest. 
For our more detailed analysis below, we assume: 
 Suitable cooperative sharing agreements can be 
negotiated with a probability s, and that these 
agreements provide exclusive use for the spectrum 
entrant for the duration of the contract.  We assume 
that the agreement is for a fraction e of the license 
holder’s electrospace.  We also assume that these do 
not require spectrum entrants to sense the spectrum.  
Formally,       and      . 
 Opportunistic sharing uses cognitive radios with on-
board sensing.  We assume that an adequate spectrum 
hole is available with some probability.  We also 
assume that n other users share the spectrum hole with 
a probability u(n), and that each spectrum user has an 
equal share of the spectrum hole’s capacity. To 
simplify the analysis, we assume that the spectrum 
hole has sufficient bandwidth with a probability q, 
where q is the probability that the spectrum hole is 
adequate after sharing it with the n users who are 
present.  Formally,       
 There is enough demand, so revenue only depends on 
the quality and net service provision. We will consider 
the impact of this assumption in section III-D.  
 Primary users establish infrastructure and purchase a 
spectrum license at the beginning of the project and 
make an irrevocable commitment for the lifespan of 
the project. We will revisit this assumption in section 
IV, where we consider managerial flexibility.  
III. NET PRESENT VALUE ANALYSIS 
A. Investment 
From the discussion above, it is clear that each spectrum 
choice that a spectrum entrant can make involves a different 
investment as well as a different return on that investment. As 
summarized in Table 1, each method incurs an infrastructure 
cost and maintenance (IM) fee which can vary across methods. 
In addition to these costs, primary users must pay the upfront 
spectrum license fee, cooperative secondary users must pay a 
periodic spectrum leasing fee as long as they operate, and 
opportunistic secondary users have to invest in sensing before 
providing services (see [3]).  
B. Benefit 
Our consideration of benefit is focused on the achievable 
revenues.  Specifically, we frame revenue as a function of the 
quality, duration and reach of the service
1
.  Here, we let the 
quality of service (QoS) of a wireless service depends on the 
absolute throughput as well as its variation.  The duration of 
service is the amount of time a service is available over the 
study interval.  Finally, the reach of the service is a 
combination of the overall coverage area as well as the 
population density of that area.   
TABLE I.  COST AND BENEFIT FOR EACH CASE 




Spectrum license fee 





Spectrum leasing fee 
 -enough bandwidth 
  depends on market 
High population density 
Op Sharing Infrastructure, IM, 
Sensing function 
 -enough bandwidth 
  depends on PU behavior, sensing 
performance, number of users 
Unlicensed 
Usage 
Infrastructure, IM  -enough bandwidth 
  depends on competition (number 
of users) 
High population density 
 
Because of the exclusivity that obtains to spectrum 
licensees, we assume that primary users have the highest and 
most predictable QoS. The duration and reach of the service is 
explicitly priced into the cost of the license and is under the 
control of the licensee.  The question that exclusive users must 
evaluate is whether they can gain an adequate return on the 
investment of the spectrum license.   
Users who engage in cooperative sharing negotiate a 
spectrum lease with primary users.  In bilateral negotiations, 
sharing can take on a number of forms (See [10] for an 
exposition on spectrum sharing negotiations in early US 
broadcast radio). For the sake of discussion, let us consider a 
few possibilities: 
1. A contract that leases a spectrum band continuously over a 
longer investment horizon (i.e., months/years) for a subset 
of the license service area; 
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 We ignore any strategic benefits for the purpose of this paper. 
2. A contract that provides for defined periodic access (e.g., 
fixed hours or days) over the investment horizon for the 
entire license service area; 
3. A contract that leases a subset of the spectrum for 
continuously over a longer investment horizon (i.e., 
months/years) for the entire license service area; 
4. A contract that provides for defined periodic access (e.g., 
fixed hours or days) over the investment horizon for the 
entire license service area for a subset of the spectrum 
license 
Clearly, many additional variations are possible.  The point in 
describing a few possibilities is that, in general, we can assume 
that the revenue is lower for cooperative secondary users than 
for exclusive users either because of the quality provided, the 
(average) duration of the access or the reach of the access. 
Spectrum entrants who choose opportunistic sharing will, in 
general, find that their revenue is subject to greater uncertainty 
because quality, duration and reach are all random variables in 
practice (depending on the type of spectrum hole).  Thus, they 
may find that their revenues are sometimes higher than 
cooperative sharers but not always.  The sources of uncertainty 
are the frequency, size and bandwidth of the spectrum holes as 
well as the likelihood of other opportunistic users who want to 
share the spectrum hole.  Thus, entrants must determine 
whether the spectrum hole density is sufficient (and in the right 
places) to warrant the investment in infrastructure and sensing 
that is necessary for this approach to work [2].   Finally, 
spectrum entrants who choose to operate in unlicensed bands 
are, in general, subject to greater interference from other 
unlicensed users and can usually operate systems of limited 
reach unless they invest in many more access points.  
As we mentioned above, we equate benefit with revenue for 
the purpose of this paper, and that this is a linear function of 
quality, duration and reach with complete certainty over the 
investment horizon.  For our first order analysis, we use a 
simple multiplicative form of this function:  
                                                                             (1) 
where,         indicates the external impact on QoS level, 
calibrated such that a license holders’ QoS level = 1,   equals 
to  for cooperative sharing, which is the probability of 
successful negotiated a spectrum contract.   is the probability 
of spectrum hole availability for opportunistic spectrum users. 
        indicates the QoS variance (similar as jitter if the 
QoS is measured as delay). In this paper, we consider   as 
contention rate.      means the contention rate is negligible. 
In a real system, contention increases costs for retransmission 
and requires a larger buffer to smooth the jitter. We only 
consider the impact from QoS variance on revenue in this 
paper.         represents the operation time, again with 
respect to a license holder.         specifies the coverage 
with     means the wireless service reaches the entire 
geographic area listed in the spectrum license. Finally,   is a 
constant and represents the revenue per unit of service 
delivered.  Since we are interested in comparing the decision of 
a spectrum entrant, we assume this is constant for all modes of 
spectrum access.   
C. NPV for the Four Choices 
In this section we use Net Present Value (NPV) to analyze 
the four spectrum choices. The NPV is an indicator of the 
valuation of each alternative. With a particular project, if the 
NPV is positive, the project brings revenue to the firm. If the 
NPV is negative, the project subtracts value from the firm. If 
the NPV equals to zero, the project does not bring monetary 
value to the firm. The formula of calculating NPV is 
                                   ∑
    
      
 
                                 (2) 
where,      is the net cash flow at time  ,   is the annual risk-
free interest rate,   is the total number of period. 
1) Exclusive use: We assume that spectrum users need to 
provide the wireless service for the entire service area  listed 
in the spectrum license (for economic and regulatory reasons). 
For simplicity, we assume that 10 base stations are needed to 
cover the entire region with a cost of $100,000 per station. For 
the sake of reliability, footprints have overlap. Thus, we 
assume that with 10 base stations, they cover 30,000,000 m
2
 
(radius = 1000m per station). Included in the $100,000 
expense is $25,000 for the cost of the radio radio, and $75,000 
for the construction cost of the base station. The spectrum 
license fee and infrastructure cost are incurred up front. We 
assume that with a $10 million spectrum license, the spectrum 
entrant can operation full time (   ) and maximize reach 
(    ). Since it is exclusive usage, primary users have 
enough bandwdith (    ) and the variance is negligible 
     . The maintanence cost is 10% of the infrastructure 
cost for all cases. The backhaul cost is assumed to be $150 per 
month per base station for exclusive use and for the two 
flavors of sharing.  
                                 ∑
      
      
 
                   (3) 
Where,     is the infrastructure cost for exclusive usage,     is 
the spectrum license fee,     is the annual revenue for 
exclusive usage,    is the maintanence cost plus backhaul 
charge per year. 
2) Cooperative Sharing: In this approach, the spectrum 
entrant incurs  no upfront spectrum license fee and the 
infrastructure cost is the same as exclusive usage if spectrum 
user plans to provide wireless service to the entire region. We 
assume that the infrastructure cost decreases with the 
geographic coverage linearly for all cases. While the leasing 
contract can take many forms, for the purpose of this analysis, 
we assume that the spectrum leasing fee depends on the 
operating time, reach, and QoS level, and occurs annually. We 
set the annual cost for spectrum leasing when         
to be $1 million
2
.  In all cases, we set the probability s (which 
describes the probability that spectrum sharing agreement can 
be negotiated) to 0.8. As we assumed before, the QoS for 
cooperative secondary users is the same as exclusive usage 
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 At this price, the lease is 150% (non-discounted) of the license cost over a 
15 year lease.  In reality, the price for the lease is dependent not only on the 
cost of a spectrum license, but also on the expected revenues an operator 
could receive. 
after they successfully negotiated the spectrum agreement, thus 
   .  
                               ∑
          
      
 
                       (4) 
Where,     is the infrastructure cost for cooperative sharing, 
    is the annual revenue,     is the spectrum leasing fee. The 
QoS for cooperative sharing depends on the spectrum 
investment. We assume that spectrum cost increases with 
contract term. With higher cost they get better QoS. We use 
two cases depicting different spectrum leasing contracts. Case 
1 refers to situation when users invest more money in spectrum 
resulting in a QoS (       ). In case 2, users invest 
less, which results in a worse QoS (                ). 
3) Opportunistic sharing: This approach requires 
equipment that can operate over a larger frequency range as 
well as requiring a sensing function. To simplify the analsyis, 
we assume that sensing will be performed by an external 
sensor network (following [11]), and we assume that they need 
10 sensors with cost of $10,000 each
3
 (this frees us from 
having to estimate the number of users, as would be necessary 
in the cognitive radio case). We assume that the radio cost is 
25% more expensive than the previous two approaches, which 
is $31,250. Therefore, the total cost for opportunistis sharing is 
$1,162,500.  
In comparison with the cooperative sharing approach, 
opportunitsitic users do not have much control over QoS. The 
QoS in opportunistic sharing is impacted by the spectrum 
availability and contention probability. The former is the result 
of the primary users’ usage and the latter is determined by 
other opportunistic users’ operations. While much is unknown 
about spectrum hole density, researchers (e.g. [8]) have built 
some preliminary models using Markov and Semi-Markov 
chains. Considerably more work is needed in this arena to 
characterize and model real-world spectrum holes, cince the 
characteristics of spectrum holes have a significant impact [3]. 
We continue with two cases to illustrate opportunistic 
sharing. In the first case the number of opportunistic users is 
low (maximum 2) and the spectrum hole availibility is high 
(0.5), it leads to higher QoS,     in this case. In the second 
scenario, the number of opporunistic users is high (maximum 
5) and the spectrum hole availibility is low (0.3), so the QoS is 
low,      . We further assume that opportunistic users work 
in the TDMA mode and that the number of users is uniformly 
distributed, thus,              ⁄ . The contention rate 
depends on the number of users; we assume that the 
contention rate for two cases are 0.8 and 0.7, repectively. The 
NPV of opportunistic sharing is thus computed as: 
 
                      ∑
      
      
 
                   (5) 
 
where     is the infrastructure cost for opportunistic sharing, 
    is the annual revenue. 
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 This is an approximate price of an RFEye spectrum monitor 
(http://j.mp/JqHNGD) .  
4) Unlicensed usage: Spectrum entrants have the least 
infrastructure cost per station in this case because the 
equipment is heavily standardized and the transmit power is 
limited. At the same time, the reach for each station is 
restricted (cell radius = 100m) because larger cells result in 
higher congestion. Thus, it requires 950 tranmitters to cover 
the entire region. We assume that each micro cell only costs 
$600, where $500 is the cost for radio and $100 is the cost for 
installation. This results in a total infrastructure cost of 
$570,000. The backhaul cost is assumed to be $50 per month 
(similar to DSL) per site, although this could be reduced by 
careful attention to the access network architecture. For 
simplicity, we assume that unlicensed users work under 
TDMA, and they get desired QoS whenever it is transmitted 
withouth contention. We also assume that there is no external 
factor impacting QoS other than MAC protocol and 
contention, therefore,    . In contrast to opportunistic or 
cooperative users, unlicensed users can work where ever they 
want, so       The transmission time ( ) depends on the 
number of active unlicensed users. As described above,   
users share the spectrum with probability     . Like 
oppotunistic sharing, unlicensed users’ QoS is determined by 
other users’ behaviors. If they are lucky enough, they are the 
only user and operate as though usage was exclusive. If there 
are other unlicensed users, the contention rate and the 
workable portion is low. We also deploy two cases in 
unlicensed bands. In the first one,          with uniform 
distribution. Thus,              ⁄  , and contetion rate is 
0.6,    . In the second case,         . Due to the large 
number of unlicensed users and non-perfect coordination, the 
contension is prone to happen (     ),    .  We calculate 
the NPV for unlicensed users as follows: 
                               ∑
     
      
 
                                   (6) 
where,    is the infrastructure cost for unlicensed users and    
is the annual revenue.  
 
Figure 2.  NPV for Sepctrum Choices 
Figure 2 illustrates the NPV for each of the 15 years of the 
project life for each scenario.  Thus, it provides us with project 
NPV (in the 15
th
 year) as well as the breakeven point (when it 
crosses NPV = 0) using the assumptions described above.  We 
see that exclusive use has the largest return in long-term, 
breaking even in the 8
th
 year. Cooperative sharing for high QoS 
has the second highest long-term NPV, though marginally so, 
being $0.3 million more than high QoS opportunistic sharing. It 
is important to reiterate here that the spectrum entrant cannot 
control whether a high outcome is possible, especially in the 
opportunistic case, because it depends on the uncertain 
availability of spectrum holes and the uncertain number of 
other users using those holes.  In the cooperative case, there is 
also uncertainty in outcome, but it can be, to some extent, 
influenced by the entrant (i.e., it is endogenous [2]) based on 
the leasing price s/he is willing to pay.  Unlicensed service is 
never profitable under our assumptions because of the high 
backhaul costs and is consistent with other research studies [12, 
13].  More nuanced conclusions that might be drawn include:  
 If spectrum users need long-term maximum gain, and 
they have enough capital for infrastructure and a 
spectrum license (assuming one is available), being an 
exclusive user is the preferred choice. 
 If the spectrum user wants to explore a new wireless 
services, the best choice is unlicensed but over a 
limited area (to control backhaul costs), since no 
agreement is needed and spectrum is always available 
through QoS is variable. 
 If spectrum users do not have enough capital at the 
beginning, but have stable annual funding for the 
project, cooperative spectrum sharing is the best 
choice, since it leads to high revenue with relative less 
sunk cost. 
 If spectrum users have some capital at the beginning of 
the project but unpredictable ongoing funding, 
opportunistic sharing may be preferred, since the NPV 
is positive and the annual cost is limited to backhaul 
and maintenance, which would have to be incurred 
anyway. 
D. Sensitivity Analysis 
Clearly, the outcomes reported above are dependent on the 
assumptions made in this paper.  To address this, we will 
examine the cost levels that will cause these outcomes to 
change. For example, we will answer question like: at what 
spectrum license fee does exclusive usage lead to the same 
long-term revenue as cooperative sharing? 
1) Exclusive Usage: According to above assumptions, if 
the probability of successfully negotiation is 0.8, the long-term 
NPV for high QoS cooperative sharing is $4,171,145. Under 
the condition that spectrum users will cover the entire license 
region, when the spectrum license fee for exclusive usage 
becomes $14,531,521, the NPV for exclusive usage is the 
same as cooperative sharing (a 45% increase). Therefore, if 
spectrum license is more expensive than this value, spectrum 
users would choose cooperative sharing over exclusive use. 
Outside the model, there are also other considerations in 
spectrum choices, such as managerial flexibility (in section 
IV) and cash availibility. If the company has a large amount of 
cash available at the beginning of operation and is not certain 
about making an annual investment, exclusive usage may still 
be a better choice even though the long-term NPV may be less 
than high quality cooperative sharing. 
2) Cooperative Sharing: Two parameters impact 
cooperative sharing. The first one is the likelihood of 
successful negotiation ( ), and the second one is the spectrum 
leasing price. Cooperative sharing is very sensitive to  . When 
           (1.6% less than original assumption) or the unit 
spectrum leasing charge is equal to $1,031,906, the high  
cooperative sharing leads to the same NPV as high quality  
opportunistic sharing (assuming this outcome can be 
obtained). Another consideration (outside the model) for 
cooperative sharing is changing to exclusive use. They have 
the same infrastructure cost and the only difference is their 
spectrum investment. If the cooperative user is certain about 
business model and a spectrum license is available, s/he can 
change to exclusive usage without wasting their previous 
investment. 
3) Opportunistic Sharing: In this strategy, users face 
uncertainties that they cannot control. The first uncertainty is 
spectrum hole availibility, the second one is the number of 
opportunistic users, and the third one is sensing cost. (1) The 
spectrum hole availability is a result of a primary users’ 
spectrum usage pattern. If the spectrum hole availibility is 
11.5%, even if there is only one opportunistic user and the 
spectrum hole covers the entire region, it leads to a negative 
NPV. (2) If the number of other opportunistic users increase 
from 2 to 10, even if the spectrum hole is available all the 
time, the NPV nearly equals high QoS unlicensed usage. (3) 
Recall that we assume that the cost for the sensing capability 
is $10K each, with one sensor per base station. When the 
sensing cost reduces to $1K per base station, high 
opportunistic sharing produces a higher NPV than low 
cooperative sharing and it is nearly equal to high cooperative 
sharing. Outside the model, when opportunistic sharing is not 
profitable, spectrum users can change to cooperative sharing. 
Changing to cooperative sharing requries a spectrum leasing 
fee and provides relative certainty of QoS. The alternative, 
changing to unlicensed usage is not profitable.  
Another key point for spectrum entrants to consider before 
undertaking opportunistic sharing is that primary users tend to 
maximize their profits. In other words, primary users will 
operate as long as it is profitable to do so. Therefore, the 
spectrum that left for opportunistic sharing may not be as 
valuable as in exclusive and cooperative sharing. For example, 
the spectrum hole may exist in area with a smaller population 
or during a time with less active customers.  Furthermore, 
license holders may behave opportunistically [2], which could 
significantly affect the expected spectrum hole availability 
statistics (such as those calculated in [8]).  
4) Unlicensed: Like opportunistic sharing, unlicensed 
users face uncertainty of number of users in the same band 
over the same area. The results of our analysis are due to the 
larger number of access points needed and the necessity of 
providing backhaul to each.  Costs can be reduced if fewer 
access points are needed, but this may run afoul of transmit 
power standards in the band and will certainly increase the 
likelihood that competing users will exist, which drives down 
QoS.  Thus, we vary only backhaul costs, not access point 
density.  The upper unlicensed choice outcome becomes 
profitable when backhaul costs are $9 (or 18% of the 
estimated value).  Note that the outcome is also dependent on 
the number of other users.  We assume that 37 is the 
maximum number of unlicensed users that the spectrum 
resource can support.   
5) General parameters: Two general parameters have a 
large influence on the spectrum choice—coverage and unit 
revenue. Coverage determines the infrastructure cost, the 
infrastructure cost increases with the size of the footprint due 
to the physical characteristics of electromagnetic waves. The 
unit revenue reflects the demand from customer side. 
Spectrum users have a clearer view after they know the 
demand.  In general, varying the coverage (or reach) 
parameter does not alter that outcome 
Performing sensitivity analysis on these the unit revenue 
parameter poses challenges beyond the scope of this paper.  
We assumed that the revenue is linear with QoS for simplicity. 
However, in reality the revenue may be log normal with QoS. 
That is the revenue is very sensitive to QoS when it is 
relatively low. In addition, spectrum users may have different 
business and service models which also impact revenues.  
Finally, the license fee negotiated in the cooperative case is 
will likely be dependent on the expected revenues, resulting in 
the need for a model that dynamically adapts. 
IV. MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY 
Tangible cash-flow is only one aspect that a firm must 
consider. Another important aspect that does not show in the 
NPV calculated above managerial flexibility. Having the 
flexibility to deal with uncertainties has value. The real options 
approach is popular for investigating risks and flexibility in a 
way that is difficult to capture in NPV-based models [14]. The 
rationale for using real options is that investments always lead 
to uncertainties in the future. Real option gives the firm the 
right but not obligation to take a specific action in the future.  
Applying real options to the secondary user decision problem 
will be treated explicitly in a future paper, but we would like to 
point out some of the benefits of this approach here.  
A. Risk and Benefit 
According to [15], a complete investment lifecycle can be 
divided into six stages. Every investment begins from inception 
stage, where investment is an implicit opportunity. At the 
recognition stage, the investment is deemed a practical 
opportunity. After making the investment decision, the project 
enters the building stage. The flag for operation stage is that the 
project starts having direct and measurable payoffs. In the 
retirement stage, indirect payoffs come from the vast 
investment in technological assets and its capabilities. When 
these assets and capabilities no longer produce payoffs, the 
investment reaches the obsolescence stage.  
Although risks exist in the entire lifecycle of investment, 
we only focus here on the three stages that involve a large 
investment and high risks. They are the recognition, building, 
and operation stages. At the recognition stage, companies 
gather information and make estimates about costs, benefits, 
and risks. In the building stage, companies make needed 
investments (e.g., transmitters, base stations, etc.) and establish 
networks. They also need to make their spectrum access 
decision in the building stage. They have four choices as 
illustrated in Section IIA. Different spectrum decisions in the 
building stages lead to different risks in the operations stage, 
where spectrum users start providing wireless services to 
customers and earn revenues based on the investment in 
infrastructure and spectrum. 
Risks in these three stages fall into four generic categories.  
 Monetary risk is due to the uncertainty about the firm’s 
ability to complete a project with long-term benefits. 
For simplicity, we do not consider demand for this 
paper. However, it is possible that spectrum users 
cannot cover their investments in infrastructure and 
spectrum if demand is weaker than anticipated.  
 Competition risk comes from the responses of other 
firms in the industry due to entry. For example, if we 
consider the spectrum access dimension, we see that 
incumbents do not face competition risks due to 
spectrum access, since their spectrum license is 
exclusive. Cooperative spectrum sharing only 
encounters competition when they lease spectrum from 
license holders. They do not compete with others 
during after making the deal. Opportunistic spectrum 
sharing and spectrum users in unlicensed bands 
confront competition all the time and there is no 
guarantee of successful operation.  
 Environmental risk considers two aspects. The first one 
is the regulation environment, which includes the 
FCC’s regulation on spectrum assignment and 
allocation. For example, the FCC may open more 
unlicensed bands to stimulate innovation. It may also 
auction more spectrum licensees to boost competitions. 
The second aspect is the market environment. 
Although the spectrum may be traded in the private 
market [16], it is still generally not considered a liquid 
market [7]. There is no guarantee that the transaction 
cost will be low or there will be enough cooperative 
spectrum sharing for secondary users. 
 Technological risks come mainly from possible 
changes in the spectrum environment. For example, the 
existing infrastructure and services may not be 
compatible for available frequency bands. The physical 
characteristics of electromagnetic waves determine the 
requirements of infrastructure and possible services.  
Interference brought by other wireless systems that 
transmit in adjacent bands and geographic areas is 
another major technological risk.  
This risk list is by no means exhaustive. There are other risks 
such as (1) project risks which consider project scope and 
staff’s ability to implement the project; (2) functionality risks 
which related to the project design; and (3) organizational risks 
which reflect firm’s cooperation and adoption of the project.  
B. Flexibility in spectrum utilization. 
1) Defer: is the ability to postpone the investment to learn 
more about the potential risks and outcomes of the project, and 
adjust to the varying situations. The defer option is available 
for all four choices in the recognition stage. Moreover, 
spectrum users can delay establishing infrastructure after they 
buy the spectrum license from the FCC. The maximum delay 
is 5 years. Other spectrum users do not have delay options in 
building stage.     
2) Switch: in this project, spectrum users have the 
flexbility to change spectrum choices, except for primary 
users. For example, if the cooperative spectrum user finds the 
spectrum market is not liquid or the price for shared bands is 
too high, he can swtich to opportunistic spectrum sharing by 
extablishing sensing technology or unlicensed bands by no 
extra expense. Unlicensed users can switch to secondary users 
if the resource competition drives the QoS to be unacceptable. 
However, primary users do not have the ability to switch. 
3) Lease: when the project payoff is too low, the resource 
(spectrum) can be leased. Only primary users can lease 
TABLE II -- RISKS AND OPTIONS IN THE INVESTMENT LIFE CYCLE 


















































































Monetary M1—firm cannot afford the project +  +  + + + +  + 
 M2—expected costs are not in line with projected benefits +     + + +  + 
 M3—shared spectrum is very expensive    + +  +   + 
Competition C1—competition for resource is high  + +     + +  
Environmental E1—action of regulatory body +      + + + + 
 E2—spectrum market liquidity  +  + +  +    
 E3—spectrum license is not available +  + + +      
Technological T1—system may be infeasible with current resource  + +    + + + + 
 T2—spectrum environment changes system requirements  + +    + + +  
 T3—Interference from other system is high  + +     + +  
spectrum, since we assume that cooperative secondary users 
consume all shared bands they purchased. 
4) Abandon: Project will be abandoned if the project 
payoff cannot cover the cost. In reality, the alternative is stop-
resume, where the project is terminated and put the available 
asset to other valuable projects. This option is outside the 
scope of this paper. 
C. Mapping risks and options in each case 
1) Exclusive Usage: As shown in Table II, if the company 
chooses to be a primary user in the building stage, they need to 
purchase the FCC issued spectrum license. the most possible 
risks in the operation stage are monetary related and leasing 
spectrum is a shadow option for risks. All other spectrum 
choices lead to more risks (uncertainties) than primary users in 
operation stage. As required for the spectrum license, primary 
users have to provide wireless services within 5 years from 
purchase. During these 5 years, they can lease spectrum to 
others. This action provides two benefits: they earn monetary 
compensation and they can better assess supply and demand 
and therefore avoid potential risks of losing money in novel 
services. In sum, primary users actually apply lease and defer 
together to manage risks. We use NPV to analyze an extreme 
case, in which primary users lease their entire spectrum for 
five years and then build their own infrasturcutre (Figure 3). 
We use the same cost and revenue assumptions as above and 
assume that the spectrum leasing fee is $1.5 million per year.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Exclusive usage NPV with Defer 
2) Cooperative sharing: Cooperative users confront 
monetary risks that come from both infrastructure and 
spectrum. They also face potential competition from license 
holders when leasing spectrum, and regulatory action; finally,  
spectrum markets highly affect cooperative secondary users. 
Technological risks are due to the uncertainty of spectrum 
supply. Cooperative secondary users may encounter 
challenges if the radios they invested in are designed for 
frequency bands that are not available. The option for 
cooperative secondary users is switch, which means they can 
change their spectrum usage choice. For example, if they have 
enough capital to invest in a license when one is available and 
they have a profitable project, cooperative secondary users can 
become license holders (exclusive users) to manage 
regulation, technology and competition risks.   
 
Figure 4.  NPV for Cooperative Shairng with Switch Option 
For this calculation, we assume that the spectrum user is 
currently in the low cooperative sharing state, and that the 
spectrum market is not feasible in year 4 but that they can 
change to another spectrum choice in year 5. Further, we 
assume that from this point all spectrum choices are based on 
full coverage. In Figure 4, we show the NPV for the switching 
option. All sharing methods lead to positive NPV (but not 
unlicensed). Exclusive usage wins due to its QoS guarantee, 
but it requires that the firm have enough cash for the license 
and that the license is available. There may also be a fee for 
changing bands. 
 
Figure 5.  NPV for Opportunistic Sharing with Switch Option 
3) Opportunistic Sharing If opportunistic sharing is of 
high quality (due to low contention and high spectrum hole 
availability), it produces the second highest NPV. However, to 
adopt this approach, the firm needs to upgrade its radios to 
those that can accommodate larger frequency bands and 
include sensing. When cooperative users switch to the 
unlicensed band, they need to rebuild the entire base station 
network. Due to the infrastructure reestablishment and high 
backhaul charge, unlicensed usage is unprofitable.  
 
 
Figure 6.  NPV for Unlicensed Usage with Switch Option 
4) Unlicensed users: have the most intense competition for 
access and the interference is unpredictable. Therefore, there is 
no guarantee of  QoS. Unlicensed users can be seen as an 
explore option, since they have the least sunk cost and the 
most flexibility in spectrum choices. As above, we assume that 
unlicensed usage is under low quality at stage 4 and confront 
spectrum choice at year 5. Figure 6 depicts the revenue for 
unlicensed users changing to other options. Not of all methods 
lead to positive revenue due to the sunk investment in 
unlicensed infrastructure and backhaul charge. However, if we 
extends the operation time to 20 years, exclusvie and 
cooperative sharing become profitable.  
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper was a continuation of our research into 
secondary users and secondary user behavior.  We have built a 
simple decision model to examine the choices that a potential 
spectrum entrant might make, and have developed this with 
some very rough estimates of some of the key cost and 
revenue components.  Given the numbers that we used, we see 
that exclusive use produces the highest NPV, though it is clear 
that this could change as our model becomes more 
sophisticated and our cost estimates more accurate.  The 
second best choice is cooperative sharing.  This is because 
QoS is predictable in this outcome, even if the success at 
negotiation is not.  Opportunistic sharing ends up being the 
third choice, mostly because of the added uncertainty.   
Finally, unlicensed sharing is generally not profitable for large 
scale deployments like this largely because of the high 
backhaul costs; these would have to be quite cheap indeed in 
order for this approach to become more attractive to spectrum 
entrants.  
Understanding and managing the risks faced by spectrum 
entrants has received little attention ([17] is one of the few 
examples).  We plan on applying real options analysis to this 
problem to better understand and model the problem(s) faced 
by secondary users with the ultimate goal of supporting the 
adoption of DSA technologies in practice.  Doing this in a 
realistic way requires that we first develop a more 
sophisticated decision model that is supported by better 
technical models.  It is also necessary to better calibrate the 
cost and revenue estimates so that the outcomes are more 
closely aligned with current or projected reality.  A more 
sophisticated analysis of the risks faced by a spectrum entrant 
will be addressed using real options.  Finally, we plan on 
incorporating these models into a an agent-based 
computational economics model (similar to [1]) to provide 
more sophisticated insight into the choice tradeoffs faced  by 
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